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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 
 Justice and Freedom Fund, as amicus curiae, respectfully submits that the 
decision of the District Court, striking the individual mandate, should be 
affirmed—but modified to strike the entire Act. 
 Justice and Freedom Fund is a California non-profit, tax-exempt corporation 
formed on September 24, 1998 to preserve and defend the constitutional liberties 
guaranteed to American citizens, through education and other means.  In this case, 
JFF is interested in striking down the Patient Protection and Affordable Health 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“the Act”) in its entirety, in 
order to preserve the individual liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and 
restrict the authority of Congress to the powers enumerated in the U.S. 
Constitution.   
 JFF’s founder is James L. Hirsen, professor of law at Trinity Law School 
and Biola University in Southern California and author of New York Times 
bestseller, Tales from the Left Coast, and Hollywood Nation.   Mr. Hirsen has 
taught law school courses on constitutional law.  Co-counsel Deborah J. Dewart is 
the author of Death of a Christian Nation, released in 2010. 
 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.   
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FED. R. APP. P. 29(C)(5) STATEMENT 
 No party’s counsel has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party 
or party’s counsel has contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief.  No person, other than amicus curiae, its members, or 
its counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 Amicus curiae Justice and Freedom Fund concurs with the District Court 
that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress authority to compel every 
American to purchase health insurance.  The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot 
salvage the Act, because Congress itself created the financial “necessity” for the 
individual mandate—its centerpiece.  The mandate is “necessary” but manifestly 
improper—it exceeds congressional powers under the Commerce Clause and 
jeopardizes the fundamental freedoms that Americans cherish.   
 But rather than sever the individual mandate, the Court should have stricken 
the entire Act.  Although such action may initially appear to be a greater intrusion 
into legislative territory, it actually preserves the separation of powers by not 
entangling the court in the extensive rewriting necessary to ferret out the sections 
that can and cannot be sustained after the mandate is excised.       





I.   THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN THE ENTIRE ACT IN 
ORDER TO PROTECT THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF 
POWERS AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.   
 
 Severability dates back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803), where the Supreme Court shaved one unconstitutional section from the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and left the rest of the Act intact.  C. Vered Jona, Note: 
Cleaning Up for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject the Presumption of 
Severability in the Face of Intentionally Unconstitutional Legislation, 76 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 698, 701 (April 2008) (“Cleaning Up”); David H. Gans, 
Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 639, 661-62 (2008) 
(“Judicial Lawmaking”).  Over the next few decades, the Court explained that 
severance is appropriate unless it would disrupt legislative intent.  Bank of 
Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829) (“If any part of the 
act be unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full 
effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the [C]onstitution....”); Allen v. 
Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880) (“The point to be determined...is whether the 
unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general scope of the law as to 
make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what appears to have 
been the intent of the legislature.”)  Moreover, the Court began to warn against 
aggressive judicial revisions that effectively make new laws rather than enforcing 
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old ones.  United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875); Hill v. Wallace, 259 
U.S. 44, 70-71 (1922).   
 The “time-honored rule” now is “to sever with circumspection, severing any 
‘problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.’”  Commonwealth of Va. 
v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 790 (E.D. Va. 2010), quoting Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“Ayotte”); see also 
Florida v. United States Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-
RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *117 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (“Florida 
v. HHS”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3161 (2010) (“Free Enterprise Fund”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 227-229 (2005); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) 
(“Alaska Airlines”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985); 
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) 
(“Champlin”); El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 
(1909).  Severability must be considered against the backdrop of separation-of-
powers principles.  Legislative intent is part of the equation, but courts must 
cautiously consider how much rewriting is necessary to save the statute.  Judicial 
Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 688. 
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 The general principle favoring severability “is not a rigid and inflexible 
rule”—particularly in a novel case like this one.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 8822, *118.  The Act is invalid because it radically exceeds the powers of 
Congress and assaults the individual liberty that Americans treasure.  But striking 
down only the individual mandate leaves the Act in shambles.  Instead, this Court 
should eschew judicial rewriting and send Congress back to the drawing board 
with a clean slate. 
A. This Court Cannot Conform The Act To The Constitution 
Without Performing Radical Surgery—A Quintessentially 
Legislative Function.  
 
 Severance is a remedial doctrine that shapes the contours of judicial relief 
after a court has found a statute unconstitutional in part.  It requires courts to 
“restrain [themselves] from rewriting [a] law to conform it to constitutional 
requirements even as [they] strive to salvage it.”  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822, *130, quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-30, Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Ass’n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).  Conventional wisdom suggests 
that striking down the entire Act would be “more of an intrusion than severing [its] 
invalid parts.”  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 672.  But like a 
Presidential veto, total invalidation “functions like a remand” to Congress (id. at 
673) and protects the separation of powers by “preserv[ing] [the] court’s role as an 
adjudicatory rather than a legislature body.”  Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
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at 712.  Reconfiguring this massive, 2700-page Act would be “a far more serious 
invasion of the legislative domain” than any court should undertake.  Florida v. 
HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *131-132, quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-
330.  Such a feat would be “tantamount to rewriting a statute in an attempt to 
salvage it” (id. at 132), “enmeshing the judiciary in policy choices...better left to 
the legislative branch.”  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 643.   
 The subject legislation is not a series of short statutes arranged together for 
convenience and thus easily severed or fine-tuned, but rather a “carefully-balanced 
and clockwork-like statutory arrangement comprised of pieces that all work toward 
one primary legislative goal.”  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, 
*118-119.  The invalid mandate is the glue that holds the Act together.  “There are 
simply too many moving parts in the Act and too many provisions dependent 
(directly and indirectly) on the individual mandate” to be able to carve it out 
without doing violence to the entire scheme.  Id.  The mandate is a legislative 
lynchpin “inextricably bound” to the remaining provisions.  Sometimes the 
connection is obvious—the limited religious exemptions, employer mandates, and 
coverage that must be included in a minimum benefits package.  Other provisions 
may or may not hinge on the individual mandate.  As Judge Vinson noted, e.g., it is 
impossible to know whether the Form 1099 reporting requirement [Act § 9006]—a 
revenue generating provision—would “stand independently of the insurance 
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reforms.”  Id. at *133-134.  The Act “must stand or fall as a single unit.”  Id. at 
*135-136.       
 Just months ago, the Supreme Court declined to “blue-pencil” legislation, 
noting some possibilities but leaving it to Congress to “pursue any of these options 
going forward.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.   The Court recognizes 
that it cannot “write words into [a] statute” or “leave gaping holes” or “foresee 
which of many different possible ways the legislature might respond to the 
constitutional objections” of a law it strikes down.  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230, 262 (2006).   In a pair of cases in the mid-1990’s, “the Court declined to 
sever, reasoning that the legislature was the proper body to fix the respective 
statute’s defects given the lack of a clear line in the statute to use for severance and 
the complexity of policy issues raised.”  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. at 647 n. 38, citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) and United States v. 
National Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).  In National Treasury 
Employees Union, the Court refused to craft a new “nexus requirement” when 
considering an honoraria ban applied to federal employees, finding that would 
involve “a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain” than the simple fix 
applied in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).  Id. at 479 n. 26.  In Grace, 
severance was an appropriate quick-fix that did not necessitate intrusive judicial 
rewriting or distort the statutory scheme.  The Court struck down a ban on 
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expression in the Supreme Court building and grounds, but only as applied to 
public sidewalks around the Court.  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180-183.  
This was more efficient than requiring Congress to pass new legislation—and it 
did not sacrifice the legislature’s policy judgment.  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. at 668. 
 A workable system of government is bound to create some overlap in the 
branches of government rather than a strict, inflexible separation.  Judicial 
Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 653; Paul M. Bator, Constitution as 
Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 Ind. L.J. 
233, 265 (1990).  But courts must avoid encroaching on legislative territory.  
“Severance should rarely, if ever, be employed if radical surgery is necessary to 
save a statute.”  Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 689.  Here, 
removal of the individual mandate would impermissibly entangle the Court in 
legislative alterations beyond the judicial domain. 
B. The Presumption Of Severability Should Be Abandoned Because 
Congress Had Knowledge Of The Act’s Constitutional Flaws.   
 
 Legislators take an oath to “support [the] Constitution.”  U.S. Const. art. VI.  
But in spite of this duty: 
Congress occasionally passes legislation that even supporters 
acknowledge poses serious constitutional concerns and presidents 
sometimes support legislation they believe to be constitutionally 
dubious, all because they sense that the courts are available as the 
ultimate arbiter of constitutional disputes.  
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Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 227, 277 (2004) (citing Joel Mowbray, The Bush Way of Compromise, 
Wash. Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at A23).  Legislators are obligated to evaluate the 
constitutionality of proposed legislation.  Paul Brest, The Conscientious 
Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 586-587 
(1975); Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 713. 
 This case is a striking example of legislators flouting their constitutional 
oath.  Instead of examining the constitutional implications, this “2,700 page bill 
was rushed to the floor for a Christmas Eve vote.”  Commonwealth of Va. v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789. Before the last-minute rush to legislate, several 
states passed laws declaring the mandate unconstitutional and exempting their own 
state residents from it.  Congress’ own attorneys “advised that the challenges might 
well have legal merit as it was ‘unclear’ if the individual mandate had ‘solid 
constitutional foundation.’”  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *124; 
see Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Congressional Research Service, 
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, July 
24, 2009, at 3, 6 (“whether Congress can use its Commerce Clause authority to 
require a person to buy a good or a service” raises a “novel issue” and “most 
challenging question”);1 see also Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 
                     
1 Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf. 
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2d 768.  A severability clause included in an early version of the Act was 
ultimately excluded.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *123-124.  
Thus there is strong evidence that Congress deliberately demanded inclusion of the 
controversial mandate—aware of its questionable constitutionality. 
 Severability is presumptively appropriate when a law is partly 
unconstitutional.  This allows legislators to pass laws without being held to a 
standard of perfection, knowing that “courts will not throw out the baby with the 
bath water.”  Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 654.  But sometimes 
inseverability is the norm: the Establishment Clause (an improper purpose 
permeates all of a statute’s applications), the Free Speech Clause (chilling effects 
test), and Equal Protection (underinclusivity).  Id. at 705 n. 42.   
 It makes sense to extend the presumption of inseverability to cases where 
Congress has purposely included a constitutionally defective statute in a legislative 
scheme.  Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 700.  A presumption of 
inseverability would discourage judicial redrafting.  It would also “increase 
legislators’ accountability for the constitutional ramifications of their actions” and 
encourage them to draft constitutional laws.  Id.  
 This Court should “send the [Act] back to [Congress] to redraft and 
renegotiate a constitutionally sound law.”  Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 
712.   Congress—having abdicated its obligation to follow the Constitution—
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should not be able to rely on the courts to repair its defective handiwork.  Id. at 
713-714, citing Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 
46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 293 (1994).   
II. THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN THE ENTIRE ACT 
BECAUSE SEVERANCE WOULD THWART THE OBJECTIVES OF 
CONGRESS IN ENACTING IT. 
 
 When a court strikes down a statute as a remedial measure, it “frustrates the 
intent of the elected representatives of the people.”  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, *130, quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-330.  Courts use 
severance to avoid circumventing the legislature’s intent.  Id.  But in this case, 
severance would frustrate that intent.  The District Court correctly found the 
individual mandate unconstitutional, but left a shredded legislative scheme in place 
by failing to strike the entire Act. 
 Critical questions about legislative intent must be addressed:   
 
• Would Congress have passed the Act without the individual mandate?   
 
• Would Congress prefer a truncated Act—or no statute at all?   
 
• If the mandate is severed:  
 
o Can the remaining provisions function independently and remain fully 
operative as law?   
 
o Would the remaining provisions still serve congressional intent, or 
would the purpose of the Act be defeated?   
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See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-3162; United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. at 246; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992); Ayotte, 546 U.S. 
at 330; Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-109 
(1976); Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234;  Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. at 83-84. 
A. It Is Virtually Certain That Congress Would Not Have Passed 
The Act Without The Individual Mandate.   
 
 Language within the Act itself exposes congressional intent:  “The 
[individual mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance markets....”  
Act § 1501(a)(2)(I). 
 Severance would be appropriate if the legislature’s goals would still be 
served.   Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *122; New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. at 187.  A relatively unimportant, uncontroversial provision is 
normally severable.  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 694 n. 18, 696 (duty-to-hire 
provisions severed from unconstitutional administrative regulations).  But where 
the legislature clearly would not have enacted the leftover portions without a 
lynchpin provision, severance is improper.   
 In spite of overwhelming evidence, the District Court found this “element of 
the analysis...difficult to apply...given the haste with which the final version of the 
2,700 page bill was rushed to the floor for a Christmas Eve vote.”  The Court 
concluded that:   
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It would be virtually impossible within the present record to determine 
whether Congress would have passed this bill, encompassing a wide 
variety of topics related and unrelated to heath care, without Section 
1501.  
  
[W]ithout the benefit of extensive expert testimony and significant 
supplementation of the record, this Court cannot determine what, if 
any, portion of the bill would not be able to survive independently.   
 
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
 
 The District Court’s conclusion is strange in light of an avalanche of 
authority—including of its own analysis.  Recent decisions confirm the centrality 
of the individual mandate.  Id. at *776 (The mandate is a “necessary measure to 
ensure the success of its larger reforms of the interstate health insurance 
market...without full market participation, the financial foundation supporting the 
health care system will fail, in effect causing the entire health care regime to 
‘implode.’”); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010) (mandate is “[i]ntegral to the legislative effort” and an “essential part 
of this larger regulation of economic activity”); Florida v. United States Dep’t. of 
Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[The 
mandate] is necessary...to meet ‘a core objective of the Act’”); Florida v. HHS, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *115-116 (“...individual mandate is absolutely 
‘necessary’ and ‘essential’ for the Act to operate as it was intended by Congress”); 
id. at *122 (“indisputably essential to what Congress was ultimately seeking to 
accomplish”); id. at *125 (“[T]he defendants have conceded that the Act’s health 
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insurance reforms cannot survive without the individual mandate....”); Liberty 
Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10cv15, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, *48, *82 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (mandate is essential to the Act); Goudy-Bachman v. 
United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6309, *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011) (mandate is a “backbone provision”). 
 However misguided the reasoning or constitutional analysis, congressional 
intent is clear:  The mandate is mandatory—the Act unravels without it.   
B. Even If The Remaining Provisions Could Function 
Independently—A Truncated Act Would Not Serve Congressional 
Purposes.  
 
 It is a closer question as to whether the remaining provisions could function 
independently: 
In a statute that is approximately 2,700 pages long and has several 
hundred sections—certain of which have only a remote and tangential 
connection to health care—it stands to reason that some (perhaps even 
most) of the remaining provisions can stand alone and function 
independently of the individual mandate. 
 
 Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *119-120.  But the more critical 
inquiry is “whether these provisions will comprise a statute that will function ‘in a 
manner consistent with the intent of Congress.’” Id. at *120-121, quoting Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.  A court must proceed cautiously, not “us[ing] its 
remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.”  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 
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330, citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).    
 Sometimes a legislative scheme can survive judicial surgery and continue to 
serve the legislature’s purposes.  Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act remained fully operative without tenure restrictions); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. at 882-883 (the overbroad Communications Decency Act of 1996 
could be salvaged by striking the words “or indecent”); Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 
at 684 (legislative veto easily severed from substantive provisions); Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. at 506-507 (court could sever portion of 
overbroad state law mandating penalties for individuals dealing in obscenity and 
prostitution); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (20-year limitation on 
religious use restrictions violated the Establishment Clause but was not essential to 
the statutory program).  In New York v. United States, the Court severed a punitive 
“take title” provision without doing violence to the rest of the legislative scheme, 
which included independent incentives for States to dispose of radioactive waste.  
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186-187. 
 This case is different.  The Florida District Court correctly held that:  
 
[A]ny statute that might conceivably be left over...would plainly not 
serve Congress’ main purpose and primary objective in passing the 
Act [health care reform]....  The Act, like a defectively designed 
watch, needs to be redesigned and reconstructed by the watchmaker.   
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Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *134-135.  The Florida Court 
declined to undertake the massive task of sorting through the Act’s myriad 
provisions in order to salvage it.  Instead, the Court suggested that Congress “do a 
comprehensive examination of the Act and make a legislative determination as to 
which of its hundreds of provisions and sections will work as intended without the 
individual mandate, and which will not.”  Id. at *135.    
C. The Absence Of A Severability Clause Weighs Against Preserving 
The Remaining Provisions.     
 
 A severability clause—if the Act contained one—would signal an intention 
to make the Act divisible.  Champlin, 286 U.S. at 235.  But such a clause is not an 
“inexorable command.”  Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924).  It merely 
creates a “rebuttable presumption that ‘eliminating invalid parts, the legislature 
would have been satisfied with what remained.’”  Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), quoting from Champlin, 286 U.S. at 235.  
 Severance, even on the legislature’s cue, poses constitutional risks because it 
“enmeshes courts in what is quintessentially legislative policy work, and does so in 
a way that makes legislative correction unlikely after the fact.”  Judicial 
Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 687.  Legislators may easily ignore 
constitutional norms in crafting laws, and courts may unwittingly create vague 
legal regimes in their efforts to salvage a partially unconstitutional scheme.  Id.  
The line between the judicial and legislative branches may be dangerously thin.    
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 On the other hand, the absence of a severability clause “does not raise a 
presumption against severability.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686; New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. at 186.  The omission does not necessarily “dictate the 
demise of the entire [Act].”  Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 684.  The Tilton 
Court reasoned that: 
In view of the broad and important goals that Congress intended this 
legislation to serve, there is no basis for assuming that the Act would 
have failed of passage without this provision; nor will its excision 
impair either the operation or administration of the Act in any 
significant respect.   
 
Id. at 684.   
 
 The Act does not contain a severability clause.  Although there is no 
presumption, the omission constitutes evidence that severability was not a priority 
on the minds of legislators and logically presents a stronger case against  
severability than would exist if the clause had been included.  Florida v. HHS, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *122.  And there is even more persuasive evidence 
against severability:  A severability clause was included in an earlier draft of the 
Act but ultimately removed.  Id. at *123-124.  The individual mandate was 
controversial during the drafting of the Act, and challenges were on the horizon.  
Id. at *124.  The Florida District Court action was filed just minutes after the 
President signed the Act.  Id. at *6. 
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 Even if the Act did contain a severability clause, that would not settle the 
issue.  The Supreme Court first limited the enforcement of a severability clause 
nearly a century ago, finding the valid provisions of the Future Trading Act were 
“so interwoven with those [unconstitutional] regulations that they [could] not be 
separated.”  Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. at 70; Cleaning Up, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
at 702.   The Act under consideration here is similar—hundreds of detailed 
interrelated provisions. 
 Neither the presence nor the absence of a severability clause conclusively 
dictates the outcome.  But the complexity of the Act, the multitude of interwoven 
provisions, and the intentional removal of a severability clause all reinforce the 
wisdom of remanding the entire scheme to Congress.  In fact, if a severability 
clause were invoked it “to salvage parts of a comprehensive, integrated statutory 
scheme, which parts, standing alone, are unworkable and in many aspects unfair, 
[that would] exalt a formula at the expense of the broad objectives of Congress.”  
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 255 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  In the absence of such 
a clause, it is all the more appropriate to steer clear of dissecting this mammoth 
piece of legislation. 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 116-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2011      Page: 28
19 
 
III. NEITHER THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE NOR THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE CAN SALVAGE THE PERVERSE 
“NECESSITY” CONGRESS ITSELF CREATED.  
 
 As Appellees thoroughly explain in their Opening and Response Brief, the 
text and history of the Commerce Clause do not support the individual mandate 
and penalty—a breathtaking expansion of congressional authority.  An individual’s 
decision not to purchase insurance is inactivity—not activity that substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  And since it lacks the power to enact the individual 
mandate in the first place, Congress cannot use the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
jump-start the Act.   
 Congress created the financial “necessity” it now employs to justify the 
mandate: 
[R]ather than being used to implement or facilitate enforcement of the 
Act’s insurance industry reforms, the individual mandate is actually 
being used as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act 
itself.  Such an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would 
have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or 
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the 
more dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or 
“necessary” the statutory fix would be. 
 
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *110-111 (emphasis added).    
 
 The Government seeks solace in the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d  at 776, 778.  But that Clause 
cannot save the law.  The individual mandate is integral to the statutory scheme—
thus “necessary”—but it is constitutionally improper.  The Government 
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presupposes that the Commerce Clause empowers it to regulate and reform the 
health insurance business.  Therefore, the Government reasons, it can also compel 
individuals to purchase policies from the insurance companies subject to the new 
regulations, in order to make the law financially viable and prevent economic 
catastrophe.  This reasoning is flawed.  The Government’s warped application of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause converts it to the “hideous monster with 
devouring jaws” that Hamilton assured us it was not, rather than the “perfectly 
harmless” part of the Constitution he assured us it was.  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, *115, citing The Federal No. 33, at 204-205.     
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Is Not A Separate Grant Of 
Authority That Congress Can Use To Penalize Americans Who 
Decline To Purchase Health Insurance. 
 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a stand-alone provision but rather “a 
caveat that Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically 
granted ‘foregoing’ powers of § 8 ‘and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution.” Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 
(1960).  Decades of precedent support this principle.  United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-1957 (2010); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 739 (1999); 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-422 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 
(1816).   
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    But if the end is illegitimate, “the fit between means and end is 
irrelevant....no matter how ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ an Act of Congress may be to its 
objective, Congress lacks authority to legislate if the objective is anything other 
than ‘carrying into Execution’ one or more of the Federal Government’s 
enumerated powers.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  These enumerated powers are carefully articulated—not left to 
congressional imagination: 
The proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the 
power of the federal government inherently extends to purposes 
affecting the nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot 
deal or cannot adequately deal, and the related notion that Congress, 
entirely apart from those powers delegated by the Constitution, may 
enact laws to promote the general welfare, have never been accepted 
but always definitely rejected by this court.     
 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 291.  The federal government can only 
claim the powers “expressly given, or given by necessary implication.”  Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 326.  
 The District Court correctly observed that “no specifically articulated 
constitutional authority exists to mandate the purchase of health insurance.”  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 780.  Congress thus lacks 
authority to penalize the failure to buy insurance—unlike the power it has to 
regulate the failure to file a tax return, which flows from the legitimate power to 
tax.   
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B. The Individual Mandate Is Not Rationally Related To The 
Implementation Of Congressional Power To Regulate The Health 
Insurance Industry.  
 
 In defining the relevant inquiry, the court must “look to see whether the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1956.  But  
[i]f a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at a particular 
point in time does not constitute the type of economic activity subject 
to regulation under the Commerce Clause, then logically an attempt to 
enforce such provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
equally offensive to the Constitution. 
 
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d  at 779.  As Justice Kennedy 
cautioned, “[t]he terms ‘rationally related’ and ‘rational basis’ must be employed 
with care.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  “Rational basis” is a test commonly employed in the context of the 
Due Process Clause.  In the Commerce Clause context (Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588-589 (1995)), there should 
be a “tangible link to commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation...a 
demonstrated link in fact.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 The District Court correctly zoomed in on the individual decision about 
whether to purchase health insurance and considered whether that activity—or 
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inactivity—can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.  Congressional power to 
regulate the insurance industry cannot be stretched to encompass the power to 
compel individuals to do business with that industry.  Even if more customers are 
“necessary” to prevent the financial collapse of the industry under the new 
regulations, it is not constitutionally proper to forcibly enroll them.  This case thus 
contrasts with National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937), upholding an injunction requiring that employers deal only with 
their employees’ chosen representatives.  Unlike the health care Act:  “The 
[National Labor Relations] Act [did] not compel agreements between employers 
and employees.  It [did] not compel any agreement whatever.”  Id., at 44-45. And 
unlike the NLRB employers and employees, who remained free to negotiate 
individual contracts and conduct business, all Americans (with rare exception) will 
soon be compelled to contract with a health insurance company for a government-
defined product.  As Justice Alito recently explained:    
The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte 
blanche. Although the term “necessary” does not mean “absolutely 
necessary” or indispensable, the term requires an “appropriate” link 
between a power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by 
Congress. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).   
 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 
 Here, the link between individual compulsion and industry regulation is too 
attenuated. 
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C. The Individual Mandate Is Hardly A “Modest” Addition To Any 
Existing Exercise Of Federal Power.  Many Portions Of The 
Constitution Would Be Superfluous If Congress Could Sweep Any 
Regulation Under The Commerce Clause Umbrella.  
 
 In Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld a “modest addition” to a set of 
federal prison-related mental-health statutes that had existed for many decades.  
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958.  The Court cautioned, however, that 
“even a longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a 
statute’s constitutionality.”  Id. at 1958.       
 The health insurance mandate is not anchored to any existing exercise of 
federal power—and it clashes with the basic freedoms that characterize America.  
Never before has the federal government required every individual to purchase a 
particular product or service as a “necessary” adjunct to its regulation of an 
industry that furnishes that product or service.  The power to regulate an industry 
does not clothe Congress with authority to command every American to do 
business with that industry.  The Commerce Clause does not stretch that far.  If it 
did, “many of Congress’ other enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, [would be] 
wholly superfluous”—including bankruptcy laws (cl. 4), coining money (cl. 5), 
fixing weights and measures (cl. 5), punishing counterfeiters (cl. 6), post offices 
and roads (cl. 7), patents and copyrights (cl. 8).  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
588-589 (Thomas, J., concurring).  These other powers overlap and substantially 
affect interstate commerce, yet they are expressly enumerated in the Constitution.  
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That enumeration cautions restraint in the extension of Commerce Clause power—
which cannot swallow all of the other federal powers and sweep within its scope 
any law Congress wants to pass.   
D. The Individual Mandate Is Not An Appropriate Means To Reform 
The Insurance Industry.  The Link Is Too Attenuated.  
 
 Congress may regulate the insurance industry under existing precedent.  See, 
e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  
Congress could impose reporting requirements on insurance carriers to monitor 
their compliance with legitimate regulations.  “Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. at 421. It is only reasonable that Congress “be entrusted with ample means” to 
execute the powers granted to it.  Id. at 408.    
 Congress has considerable flexibility and discretion to enact laws that are 
“convenient or useful” or “conducive” to its exercise of legitimate authority.  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d  at 778, quoting United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 408).  If, 
for example, Congress appropriates funds under its Spending Clause authority, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 1, “it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power 
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are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away....”  Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). 
 But the link between means and end must not be so attenuated as to require a 
court to “pile inference upon inference.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963.  When the court evaluates the causal 
chain: 
The inferences must be controlled by some limitations lest, as Thomas 
Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely 
unbounded by linking one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable 
game of “‘this is the house that Jack built.’” Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800), 31 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 547 (B. Oberg ed. 2004); see also United States v. 
Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 628 (10th  
Cir. 2006). 
 
Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Moreover, the analysis should consider not 
only “the number of links in the congressional-power chain” but also “the strength 
of the chain.”  Id.  In Comstock, the majority found the statute at issue to be a 
“reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means” to pursue a legitimate 
government interest.  Id. at 1965. 
 To sustain the individual mandate would require this Court to “pile inference 
upon inference”—an approach the Supreme Court has rejected.  As the Florida 
District Court recently explained: 
[T]he mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, 
has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce (not 
“slight,” “trivial,” or “indirect,” but no impact whatsoever).   
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Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, *92.  The Government can only 
make the connection to interstate commerce by piling up inferences and 
speculating about future contingencies in the lives of those who do not purchase 
insurance.  Id. at *93.     
E. The Individual Mandate May Be “Necessary” But It Is Improper 
Because It Erodes Individual Liberties At The Core of American 
Freedom. 
 
 The Act has profound implications for “our notions of liberty,” which “are 
inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination.”  
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  It requires Americans to enter a contract to pay for a 
service—medical treatment—they are constitutionally privileged to refuse.   This is 
no more constitutional than compelling Americans to donate funds to a church they 
are not required to attend or otherwise support.    Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 15-16 (1947). 
 However “necessary” the mandate may appear to the Act, it must “consist 
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution” (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 
421) and not violate or infringe another independent constitutional provision.  
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 778; United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956-1957; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 132; United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).  
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 The individual mandate collides with the right of every competent adult to 
refuse medical treatment.  This principle is the “logical corollary of the doctrine of 
informed consent.”  Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. at 270.  
See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222 (1990) (prisoner has 
significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted psychotropic drugs); Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital coupled with 
mandatory behavior modification treatment implicated liberty interests); Parham v. 
J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (“[A] child, in common with adults, has a 
substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical 
treatment.”).   
 Under the Government’s expansive view of its authority, “if the decision to 
forego insurance qualifies as activity, then presumably the decision to not use that 
insurance once it has been obtained is also activity.”  Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, *102-103.  Extending the rationale used to justify the Act, 
Congress could easily manufacture the power to regulate Americans’ economic 
decisions “not to go to the doctor for regular check-ups and screenings to improve 
health and longevity, which, in turn, is intended and expected to increase economic 
productivity.”  Id. at *103.  This possibility is not “irrelevant [or] fanciful” but is 
part of a serious discussion among legal scholars debating the constitutionality of 
the Act.  Id. at *87-88. 
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 The Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the government to 
infringe...fundamental liberty interests at all...unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993).  There are limited exceptions where the state may override the right to 
refuse medical treatment.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) 
(mandatory smallpox vaccine necessary to contain epidemic).  But “[t]he 
regulation of constitutionally protected decisions...must be predicated on legitimate 
state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the individual has made....”  
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990). 
 American notions of liberty encompass freedom of choice even in 
“mandatory markets” like food, housing, transportation, and health care.    
Everyone must eat but may choose what to eat—some are vegetarians, some 
nutrition conscious, others wary of food allergies.  Everyone needs lodging but 
may choose where to live, whether to rent or buy, and whether to live alone or with 
others.  Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“The Constitution 
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”)  Everyone needs 
transportation, but may choose whether to travel by car, motorcycle, bus, train, 
airplane, bicycle, or even horse and buggy.  Americans are free to lease or own a 
vehicle and select the brand, size, and color.  In the same way, Americans are free 
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to choose whether or not they will undergo medical treatment, and if so, how they 
will pay for the services. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should affirm the District Court decision but modify it to strike 
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